

# **SIDC OPSCOM Report on Automatic Partial Decoupling During the Intraday Auction IDA2 for Delivery Date 10/12/2025**

10.12.2025

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# 1. Executive Summary

This report informs stakeholders on the critical incident related to the Intraday Auction IDA2 for delivery date 10/12/2025.

## Cause of Incident

On 09/12/2025, during the IDA2 session for DD20251210, OTE was unable to provide OBKs because of an issue with the financial security module in OTE LTS that occurred after the deadline for PD in advance. This led to an automatic partial decoupling.

# 2. Intraday Auctions Explained

SIDC creates a single EU cross-zonal intraday electricity market. As renewable intermittent production such as solar and wind energy increases, market participants are becoming more interested in trading in the intraday markets. This is because it has become more challenging for market participants to be in balance (i.e. supplying the correct amount of energy) after the closing of the Day-Ahead market.

Complementing the continuous intraday trading, the newly introduced intraday auctions are designed to enhance the efficiency of the market by harmonizing the calculation and allocation of cross-border capacities, while pricing intraday cross-border capacities to reflect their shortage at a given time and thereby send an adequate price signal to the market.


Intraday auctions provide the ability to accumulate offers and efficiently allocate the scarce transmission capacity. This is a novelty in the intraday timeframe, since capacity in the continuous intraday trading was allocated - before the introduction of IDAs - on a first-come first served basis. IDAs are the first intraday auction involving most of the European countries.

See for more information the following websites:


- ▶ [ENTSO-E](#)
- ▶ [NEMO Committee](#)

## 2.1 Normal Process & Timings


### MCSC Daily Timeline



### SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15h00 / 22h00 / 10h00 CE(S)T



### SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15h00 / 22h00 / 10h00 CE(S)T (Including Extension)



Intraday Auctions are organized multiple times per day with a predefined moment in time for the closure of the Orderbooks, commonly known as Order Book Gate Closure Time (OBK GCT). Twenty minutes prior to this Order Book Gate Closure Time, the allocation of Cross Zonal Capacity via Intraday Continuous Trading (IDCT) is halted to allow the TSOs to update capacities based on the latest capacity calculations and accordingly provide the Cross Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints to the Intraday Auction. Starting from the Order Book Gate Closure Time, the NEMOs share the Cross Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints between the involved NEMO systems. From that same moment on, the NEMOs start delivering their Order Books to the central NEMO systems running the Intraday Auction. As soon as the NEMOs have provided the Order Books the actual coupling starts, considering the Cross Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints.

Once the Intraday Auction results are available, NEMOs start validating the results and these are made available to the TSO for validation by the Capacity Management Module of SIDC and for actual allocation of the Cross Zonal Capacity on respective Bidding Zone Borders. All these steps are to be completed within a strict time window, after which automatically the reopening of cross border trading in Continuous Trading will be triggered, and automatic cancellation of the Intraday Auction will take place.

## 2.2 Incident Management Process

An incident is an unwanted event in the SIDC IDA systems, the local NEMO or TSO systems connected to SIDC IDA, or the communication channels connecting them. An incident that requires triggering an Incident Committee (IC) call has the following characteristics: the issue(s) causing the incident cannot be solved through a (Local) Backup procedure and can thereby breach a deadline of the SIDC.

The operational parties agreed to follow the Incident Management procedure to handle incidents. The Incident Management procedure assumes that communication to relevant third parties (e.g. CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participants, etc.) is done by the involved TSOs and NEMOs by following their local procedures.

As a general principle, the Incident Management procedure outlines how incidents are handled. This includes the operation of the Incident Committee (IC) and the application of procedures such as closing and reopening interconnectors, closing and restarting market or delivery area(s) or trading service and corresponding local procedures, exchanging files using a backup mode, etc.

As soon as an incident occurs that impacts any of the Single Intraday Market Coupling processes, an Incident Committee (IC) needs to be started, which will be convened by the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator.

Participants to the Incident Committee (IC) identify the issue(s), assess and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC/IDA Coordinator tracks all relevant information on the incident, the discussions during the Incident Committee (IC), and the decision(s) taken during the Incident Committee (IC) call.

At the start of the Incident Committee (IC) the IC SPOC and/or the incident reporter and/or the IDA Coordinator presents the issue. The parties discuss actions already taken by the affected party and immediate actions deemed necessary. The parties further consider correct classification of the incident for XBID related incidents.

The parties discuss potential solutions for the incident, where needed, on recommendation of the service provider. Once a solution has been identified, the parties decide on the application of the agreed solution.

During the Incident Committee (IC) the parties also decide on the deemed necessary communication to the market participants.

Within typically 2 hours after closing the Incident Committee (IC) call the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator will create/finalize the Incident Committee (IC) report and make it available to all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties need to review, and if applicable, update the Incident Committee (IC) report. In case of IDCT issues affecting IDAs, the IC SPOC will create the Incident Committee (IC) report and in case of IDA issues affecting IDCT, the IDA Coordinator will be in charge.

## **3. Incident Description**

### **3.1 Course of Events**

10/12/2025 during IDA2 DD20251210 OTE could not provide OBKs because of an issue with the financial security module in OTE LTS that occurred after the deadline for PD in advance. In line with procedures, automatic partial decoupling was triggered at 22:12 hrs and all parties except OMIE, GME and Henex were automatically decoupled.

## 3.2 Timeline

Event	Start Date & Time	End Date & Time
OTE noticed that they have problems with the preparation of the order book for IDA2 DD20251210 because of an issue in the financial security module of the local trading system.	09/12/2025 22:02	
OTE, as IDA coordinator, sent an Incident Committee invitation, which is mandatory for NEMOS and TSO IDA operators.	09/12/2025 22:02	
Because of the decoupling of the current coordinator, GME took over the coordinator role.	09/12/2025 22:06	
Automatic partial decoupling has been triggered in line with procedures, including sending the message IDA_JOINT_07 to IDA parties and market participants. Market Coupling Session (MCS) continued in line with the process for remaining participants, i.e. for HENEX, GME and OMIE.	09/12/2025 22:12	
IDA2 has been finished for parties that remained coupled.	09/12/2025 22:26	
OTE resumes the coordinator role.	09/12/2025 22:30	
OTE informed that is expected to solve the issue before the next IDA session.	09/12/2025 22:31	
Incident Committee Conference Call (ICCC) has been closed.	09/12/2025 22:31	

### 3.3 Incident Cause

Issue with OBK from OTE occurred after the deadline for partial decoupling in advance.

#### Impacted NEMOs

All NEMOs except OMIE, GME and HENEX.

#### Impacted Bidding Zones

All Bidding Zones except Greece, Italy and Spanish bidding zones.

#### Impacted Borders

All Borders except Greece, Italy and Spanish borders.

## 4. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learned

To ensure successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

<b>Short-term Solution by Affected Party</b>	OTE already performed updates of the financial security module in LTS to mitigate the risk that issue will occur again.
<b>Long-term Measures by Affected Party</b>	N/A
<b>SIDC Project Lessons Learned</b>	N/A