



SIDC OPSCOM Report on Automatic Partial Decoupling with Regards to the Intraday Auction 1 for Delivery Date 04/07/2025

16.07.2025

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1. Executive Summary

This report informs stakeholders of the critical incident related to the Intraday Auction 1 for delivery date 04/07/2025.

Impacted NEMOs

All NEMOs besides GME, OMIE and HENEX.

Impacted Bidding Zones

NL, BE, FR, DE/LU, AT, PL, NO, SE, FI, DK, SI, HU, CZ, LT, LI, EE, BG, HR, SK, RO, ES, PT, IT, GR.

Impacted Borders

All borders besides ES-PT and GR-ITSUD.

Cause of Incident

Before IDA 1 session for DD 04/07/2025, PSE experienced technical issues with the communication channels between NEMOs and TSOs, pre- and post-coupling applications, and discontinuity and incompleteness of data in their database, making it impossible to manage any post-coupling activities. They requested a decoupling of the Polish BZ (all Polish borders). However, due to the fact that TSOs cannot perform a decoupling from an IDA at the bidding zone level (only NEMOs can) and the deadline for partial decoupling in advance had been missed, NordPool decided to withhold the order book which included the Polish area, in order to trigger the decoupling of the whole BZ. This action was in line with the aim of minimizing consequences for the borders PL-SE4, PL-LT, PL-CZ, PL-DE, PL-SK, the Polish BZ as well as Nord Pool's Polish members.

Consequently, the automatic partial decoupling was triggered, decoupling all areas except Italy and Greece. Spain and Portugal were unaffected as they had been partially decoupled in advance. The issues that arose during the session were mitigated, therefore the IDA2 session for delivery date 04/07/2025 went smoothly and the results were published according to the normal procedural timings.

2. Intraday Auctions Explained

SIDC creates a single EU cross-zonal intraday electricity market. As renewable intermittent production such as solar and wind energy increases, market participants are becoming more interested in trading in the intraday markets. This is because it has become more challenging

for market participants to be in balance (i.e. supplying the correct amount of energy) after the closing of the day-ahead market.

Complementing the continuous intraday trading, the newly introduced intraday auctions are designed to enhance the efficiency of the market by harmonizing the calculation and allocation of cross-border capacities, while pricing intraday cross-border capacities to reflect their shortage at a given time and thereby send an adequate price signal to the market.

Intraday auctions provide the ability to accumulate offers and efficiently allocate the scarce transmission capacity. This is a novelty in the intraday timeframe, since capacity in the continuous intraday trading was allocated - before the introduction of IDAs - on a first-come first served basis. IDAs are the first intraday auction involving most of the European countries.

See for more information the following websites:


- ▶ [ENTSO-E](#)
- ▶ [NEMO Committee](#)

2.1 Normal Process & Timings


MCSC Daily Timeline



SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15h00 / 22h00 / 10h00 CE(S)T



SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15h00 / 22h00 / 10h00 CE(S)T (Including Extension)



Intraday Auctions are organized multiple times per day with a predefined moment in time for the closure of the Orderbooks, commonly known as Order Book Gate Closure Time (OBK GCT). Twenty minutes prior to this Order Book Gate Closure Time, the allocation of Cross Zonal Capacity via Intraday Continuous Trading (IDCT) is halted to allow the TSOs to update capacities based on the latest capacity calculations and accordingly provide the Cross Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints to the Intraday Auction. Starting from the Order Book Gate Closure Time, the NEMOs share the Cross Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints between the involved NEMO systems. From that same moment on, the NEMOs start delivering their Order Books to the central NEMO systems running the Intraday Auction. As soon as the NEMOs have provided the Order Books the actual coupling starts, considering the Cross Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints.

Once the Intraday Auction results are available, NEMOs start validating the results and these are made available to the TSO for validation by the Capacity Management Module of SIDC and for actual allocation of the Cross Zonal Capacity on respective Bidding Zone Borders. All these steps are to be completed within a strict time window, after which automatically the reopening of cross border trading in Continuous Trading will be triggered, and automatic cancellation of the Intraday Auction will take place.

2.2 Incident Management Process

An incident is an unwanted event in the SIDC IDA systems, the local NEMO or TSO systems connected to SIDC IDA, or the communication channels connecting them. An incident that requires triggering an Incident Committee (IC) call has the following characteristics: the issue(s)

causing the incident cannot be solved through a (Local) Backup procedure and can thereby breach a deadline of the SIDC.

The operational parties agreed to follow the Incident Management procedure to handle incidents. The Incident Management procedure assumes that communication to relevant third parties (e.g. CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participants, etc.) is done by the involved TSOs and NEMOs by following their local procedures.

As a general principle, the Incident Management procedure outlines how incidents are handled. This includes the operation of the Incident Committee (IC) and the application of procedures such as closing and reopening interconnectors, closing and restarting market or delivery area(s) or trading service and corresponding local procedures, exchanging files using a backup mode, etc. As soon as an incident occurs that impacts any of the Single Intraday Market Coupling processes, an Incident Committee (IC) needs to be started, which will be convened by the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator.

Participants to the Incident Committee (IC) identify the issue(s), assess and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC/IDA Coordinator tracks all relevant information on the incident, the discussions during the Incident Committee (IC), and the decision(s) taken during the Incident Committee (IC) call.

At the start of the Incident Committee (IC) the IC SPOC and/or the incident reporter and/or the IDA Coordinator presents the issue. The parties discuss actions already taken by the affected party and immediate actions deemed necessary. The parties further consider correct classification of the incident for XBID related incidents.

The parties discuss potential solutions for the incident, where needed, on recommendation of the service provider. Once a solution has been identified, the parties decide on the application of the agreed solution.

During the Incident Committee (IC) the parties also decide on the deemed necessary communication to the market participants.

Within typically 2 hours after closing the Incident Committee (IC) call the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator will create/finalize the Incident Committee (IC) report and make it available to all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties need to review, and if applicable, update the Incident Committee (IC) report. In case of IDCT issues affecting IDAs, the IC SPOC will create the Incident Committee (IC) report and in case of IDA issues affecting IDCT, the IDA Coordinator will be in charge.

3. Incident Description

3.1 Course of Events

PSE (TSO) requested the manual exclusion of the Polish BZ (all Polish borders) from the IDA1.

3.2 Timeline

Event	Start Date & Time	End Date & Time
Incident occurrence.	11:24; 03.07.2025	17:00; 03.07.2025
Service Halt for ID for Polish BZ and all PL-interconnectors.	11:57	17:10
Triggering of Incident Committee.	14:21 (by ticket in Jira)	
PSE request to exclude PL BZ from IDA1 (at IC).	14:31	
HENEX as IDA coordinator informed PSE that time deadline (14:30) for performing partial decoupling of relevant virtual brokers before IDA1 session is already missed.	14:35	
NordPool decided to not send OBK due to PSE issues.	14:56	
PSE confirmed that the issue is unresolved.	15:12	
Automatic Partial Decoupling triggered due to missing NordPool OBK.	15:15	

Ad-hoc OPSCOM call was triggered to communicate on the issue before IDA2.	17:00	
PSE, during OPSCOM, informed that the issue is resolved and IDA2 can proceed normally.	17:05	

3.3 Incident Cause

The incident was caused by the disconnection (emergency shut down without automatic failover & data recovery) of servers (IT infrastructure) in PSE due to malfunction of air conditioning in the server room. This led to a disruption in the technical communication channels towards other NEMOs and TSOs, in the pre- and post-coupling applications, and it also led to a discontinuity and incompleteness of data in an internal PSE database.

The recovery of connection took a long time, due to a required manual start-up of servers and activation of recovery procedures in the overheated server room.

As PSE was having critical issues, it was Nord Pool's understanding that any auction which included the Polish area would result in adverse consequences for the Polish market, its neighbours and Nord Pool's own members. Nord Pool's risk mitigation decision was to withhold the orderbook which included the Polish area. It was determined that an automatic partial decoupling presented a significantly lower risk to Polish parties than staying coupled.

3.4 Impacted NEMOs, Bidding Zones and Borders

Impacted NEMOs

All NEMOs besides GME, OMIE and HENEX.

Impacted Bidding Zones

All Bidding Zones besides ES, PT, GR and Italian Bidding Zones.

Impacted Borders

All borders besides ES-PT and GR-ITSUD.

4. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learned

To ensure successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

Short-term Solution by Affected Party	PSE - IT infrastructure reconfiguration.
Long-term Measures by Affected Party	PSE - IT infrastructure upgrade/investments, All (SIDC) - Improvement in ICT procedures.
SIDC Project Lessons Learned	N/A