SIDC OPSCOM Report on Cancellation of Intraday Auction 2 for Delivery Date 16/07/2025

21/07/2025

Content

1. Executive Summary

This report informs stakeholders on the critical incident (cancellation) related to the Intraday Auction IDA2 for delivery date 16/07/2025.

Cause of Incident

On 15/07/2025 around 17:00 CEST, TenneT NL prepared for a short period of operational unavailability of the NorNed interconnector for delivery day 16/07/2025 between 11:00 and 12:00 CEST when a physical flow on the interconnector would not be possible. The TSOs have several options in the XBID system to restrict trading for dedicated Market Time Units (MTUs), which are mostly applied depending on the urgency of the closure and the characteristics of the maintenance.

TenneT NL decided for an early closure of the MTUs covering the maintenance period, by setting the end time of the allocation period for each of the respective MTUs to 15/07/2025 17:30 CEST. Accordingly, the XBID system will not allow for any allocation on the respective MTUs after the end time of the allocation period, neither from SIDC Continuous Trading nor from SIDC Intraday Auctions.

Concerning the ATCs for the respective MTUs, the expectation of TenneT NL (and basically all TSOs) is that the respective MTUs should have had 0 MW ATCs once the end time of the allocation period had been reached, similar to MTUs in Allocation Halt state.

However, during the usual preparation of the IDA2 for delivery date 16/07/2025 (step between 21:40 and 21:55 CEST), the XBID system provided non-zero ATCs for the respective MTUs on the NorNed interconnector to the IDA2.

The IDA2 was executed normally and ended with results for the full delivery day of 16/07/2025. From there the validation of the results of the IDA 2 started as usual including capacity allocations for the NorNed interconnector, containing non-zero capacity allocations for the closed MTUs 11:00 – 12:00. The XBID system validated the non-zero capacity allocations and accordingly rejected these non-zero capacity allocations for the closed MTUs 11:00 – 12:00.

In line with the agreed process, the partial rejection of IDA2 allocations by the XBID system implies a full rejection of the IDA2 results by the TSOs and accordingly a cancellation of the IDA2.

2. Intraday Auctions Explained

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) creates a single EU cross-zonal intraday electricity market. As renewable intermittent production such as solar and wind energy increases, market participants are becoming more interested in trading in the intraday markets. This is because it has become more challenging for market participants to be in balance (i.e. supplying the correct amount of energy) after the closing of the day-ahead market.

Complementing the continuous intraday trading, the newly introduced intraday auctions are designed to enhance the efficiency of the market by harmonizing the calculation and allocation of cross-border capacities, while pricing intraday cross-border capacities to reflect their shortage at a given time and thereby send an adequate price signal to the market.

Intraday auctions provide the ability to accumulate offers and efficiently allocate the scarce transmission capacity. This is a novelty in the intraday timeframe, since capacity in the continuous intraday trading was allocated - before the introduction of IDAs - on a first-come first served basis. IDAs are the first intraday auction involving most of the European countries.

See for more information the following websites:

- ENTSO-E
- NEMO Committee

2.1 Normal Process & Timings

MCSC Daily Timeline

SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15h00 / 22h00 / 10h00 CE(S)T



SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15h00 / 22h00 / 10h00 CE(S)T (Including Extension)



Intraday Auctions are organized multiple times per day with a predefined moment in time for the closure of the Orderbooks, commonly known as Order Book Gate Closure Time (OBK GCT). Twenty minutes prior to this Order Book Gate Closure Time, the allocation of Cross Zonal Capacity via Intraday Continuous Trading (IDCT) is halted to allow the TSOs to update capacities based on the latest capacity calculations and accordingly provide the Cross Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints to the Intraday Auction. Starting from the Order Book Gate Closure Time,

the NEMOs share the Cross Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints between the involved NEMO systems. From that same moment on, the NEMOs start delivering their Order Books to the central NEMO systems running the Intraday Auction. As soon as the NEMOs have provided the Order Books the actual coupling starts, considering the Cross Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints.

Once the Intraday Auction results are available, NEMOs start validating the results and these are made available to the TSO for validation by the Capacity Management Module of SIDC and for actual allocation of the Cross Zonal Capacity on respective Bidding Zone Borders. All these steps are to be completed within a strict time window, after which automatically the reopening of cross border trading in Continuous Trading will be triggered, and automatic cancellation of the Intraday Auction will take place.

2.2 Incident Management Process

An incident is an unwanted event in the SIDC IDA systems, the local NEMO or TSO systems connected to SIDC IDA, or the communication channels connecting them. An incident that requires triggering an Incident Committee (IC) call has the following characteristics: the issue(s) causing the incident cannot be solved through a (Local) Backup procedure and can thereby breach a deadline of the SIDC.

The operational parties agreed to follow the Incident Management procedure to handle incidents. The Incident Management procedure assumes that communication to relevant third parties (e.g. CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participants, etc.) is done by the involved TSOs and NEMOs by following their local procedures.

As a general principle, the Incident Management procedure outlines how incidents are handled. This includes the operation of the Incident Committee (IC) and the application of procedures such as closing and reopening interconnectors, closing and restarting market or delivery area(s) or trading service and corresponding local procedures, exchanging files using a backup mode, etc.

As soon as an incident occurs that impacts any of the Single Intraday Market Coupling processes, an Incident Committee (IC) needs to be started, which will be convened by the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator.

Participants to the Incident Committee (IC) identify the issue(s), assess and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC/IDA Coordinator tracks all relevant information on the incident, the discussions during the Incident Committee (IC), and the decision(s) taken during the Incident Committee (IC) call.

At the start of the Incident Committee (IC) the IC SPOC and/or the incident reporter and/or the IDA Coordinator presents the issue. The parties discuss actions already taken by the affected party and immediate actions deemed necessary. The parties further consider correct classification of the incident for XBID related incidents.

The parties discuss potential solutions for the incident, where needed, on recommendation of the service provider. Once a solution has been identified, the parties decide on the application of the agreed solution.

During the Incident Committee (IC) the parties also decide on the deemed necessary communication to the market participants.

Within typically 2 hours after closing the Incident Committee (IC) call the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator will create/finalize the Incident Committee (IC), report and make it available to all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties need to review, and if applicable, update the Incident Committee (IC) report. In case of IDCT issues affecting IDAs, the IC SPOC will create the Incident Committee (IC) report and in case of IDA issues affecting IDCT, the IDA Coordinator will be in charge.

3. Incident Description

3.1 Course of Events

Due to the way the maintenance on NorNed interconnector was configured in the XBID system, a rejection of IDA2 results was caused followed by an automatic cancellation of IDA2 by the XBID system.

3.2 Timeline

Event	**Start** **Date & Time**	**End** **Date & Time**
Allocation Request sent from IDA to XBID (normal process).	15/07/2025 22:15.45	
Incident occurrence XBID CMM replies with an ErrorResponse (request rejection).	15/07/2025 22:15.46	

IDA Coordinator (OMIE) triggers Incident Committee.	15/07/2025 22:19	
Attempt by JAO to manually upload another Allocation Request fails.	15/07/2025 22:19	
NEMOs agree with JAO that IDA2 will be cancelled .	15/07/2025 22:19	
JAO confirms that CMM did not accept any allocation, so no reverse allocation is to be triggered. JAO confirms that IDA2 is automatically cancelled in CMM.	15/07/2025 22:20	
The IDA Coordinator sends the IDA2 cancellation email IDA_JOINT_09: IDA Cancellation . IDA2 aborted in all NEMOs' PMB .	15/07/2025 22:29	15/07/2025 22:30
The IDA Coordinator creates an XBID ticket to meet the IC SPOC, DBAG and JAO in order to clarify the situation with the CMM. DBAG informs that they will need more time to analyze the root cause.	15/07/2025 22:43	15/07/2025 22:52
Ad-Hoc OPSCOM invitation sent by OMIE to meet on 16/07/2025 at 8.30 am to verify with DBAG that CMM is correctly configured to perform IDA3.	15/07/2025 22:58	
Ad-Hoc OPSCOM. Root cause clarified by TenneT and confirmed that CMM is correctly configured to perform IDA3.	16/07/2025 08:30	

3.3 Incident Cause

The incident was caused by the incompatibility between the method of contract modification (changing the allocation period settings of a MTU in XBID) and the IDA process. Arranging a maintenance by means of early ending of the allocation period of MTUs (prior the start of the IDA) does not prevent XBID to make capacity available for those MTUs to the IDA. However, later on in the IDA process, XBID will not allow the IDA to allocate any capacity for those MTUs.

At the moment of the incident the TSOs were not aware of this incompatibility.

3.4 Impacted NEMOs, Bidding Zones and Bidding Zone Borders

Impacted NEMOs

All NEMOs participating in IDA2.

Impacted Bidding Zones

All Bidding Zones participating in IDA2.

Impacted Borders

All Borders included in IDA2.

4. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learned

To ensure successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

Short-term Solution by Affected Party	Modification of procedure indicating the different behaviour of the XBID system, i.e. ending the allocation period for a MTU will not stop the provision of capacity to the IDA.
Long-term Measures by Affected Party	Modification of the XBID system to align the behaviour concerning ATC provision to IDAs along different methods to prevent allocations, i.e. ending the allocation period for a MTU versus setting the state of the MTU to Allocation Halt.
SIDC Project Lessons Learned	N/A