SIDC OPSCOM Report on Cancellation of the Intraday Auction IDA1 for Delivery Date 01/11/2025

07.11.2025

1. Executive Summary

This report informs stakeholders on the critical incident related to the Intraday Auction IDA1 for delivery date 01/11/2025.

Cause of Incident

On 31/10/2025 at 14:43:52, Terna halted all their interconnectors during the usual preparation of the IDA 1 for delivery day 01/11/2025. However, the XBID system provided non-zero ATCs for the respective MTUs on the interconnectors to the IDA1.

The IDA1 was executed normally and ended with results for the full delivery day of 01/11/2025. From there the validation of the results of the IDA1 started as usual including capacity allocations for the affected interconnectors, containing non-zero capacity allocations for the closed MTUs. The XBID system validated the non-zero capacity allocations and accordingly rejected these non-zero capacity allocations for the closed MTUs.

In line with the agreed process, the partial rejection of IDA1 allocations by the XBID system implies a full rejection of the IDA1 results by the TSOs and accordingly a cancellation of the IDA1.

2. Intraday Auctions Explained

SIDC creates a single EU cross-zonal intraday electricity market. As renewable intermittent production such as solar and wind energy increases, market participants are becoming more interested in trading in the intraday markets. This is because it has become more challenging for market participants to be in balance (i.e. supplying the correct amount of energy) after the closing of the Day-Ahead market.

Complementing the continuous intraday trading, the newly introduced intraday auctions are designed to enhance the efficiency of the market by harmonizing the calculation and allocation of cross-border capacities, while pricing intraday cross-border capacities to reflect their shortage at a given time and thereby send an adequate price signal to the market.

Intraday auctions provide the ability to accumulate offers and efficiently allocate the scarce transmission capacity. This is a novelty in the intraday timeframe, since capacity in the continuous intraday trading was allocated - before the introduction of IDAs - on a first-come first served basis. IDAs are the first intraday auction involving most of the European countries.

See for more information the following websites:

- ENTSO-E

- NEMO Committee

2.1 Normal Process & Timings

MCSC Daily Timeline

SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15h00 / 22h00 / 10h00 CE(S)T



SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15h00 / 22h00 / 10h00 CE(S)T (Including Extension)



Intraday Auctions are organized multiple times per day with a predefined moment in time for the closure of the Orderbooks, commonly known as Order Book Gate Closure Time (OBK GCT). Twenty minutes prior to this Order Book Gate Closure Time, the allocation of Cross Zonal Capacity via Intraday Continuous Trading (IDCT) is halted to allow the TSOs to update capacities based on the latest capacity calculations and accordingly provide the Cross Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints to the Intraday Auction. Starting from the Order Book Gate Closure Time, the NEMOs share the Cross Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints between the involved NEMO systems. From that same moment on, the NEMOs start delivering their Order Books to the central NEMO systems running the Intraday Auction. As soon as the NEMOs have provided the Order Books the actual coupling starts, considering the Cross Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints.

Once the Intraday Auction results are available, NEMOs start validating the results and these are made available to the TSO for validation by the Capacity Management Module of SIDC and for actual allocation of the Cross Zonal Capacity on respective Bidding Zone Borders. All these steps are to be completed within a strict time window, after which automatically the reopening of cross border trading in Continuous Trading will be triggered, and automatic cancellation of the Intraday Auction will take place.

2.2 Incident Management Process

An incident is an unwanted event in the SIDC IDA systems, the local NEMO or TSO systems connected to SIDC IDA, or the communication channels connecting them. An incident that requires triggering an Incident Committee (IC) call has the following characteristics: the issue(s) causing the incident cannot be solved through a (Local) Backup procedure and can thereby breach a deadline of the SIDC.

The operational parties agreed to follow the Incident Management procedure to handle incidents. The Incident Management procedure assumes that communication to relevant third parties (e.g. CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participants, etc.) is done by the involved TSOs and NEMOs by following their local procedures.

As a general principle, the Incident Management procedure outlines how incidents are handled. This includes the operation of the Incident Committee (IC) and the application of procedures such as closing and reopening interconnectors, closing and restarting market or delivery area(s) or trading service and corresponding local procedures, exchanging files using a backup mode, etc.

As soon as an incident occurs that impacts any of the Single Intraday Market Coupling processes, an Incident Committee (IC) needs to be started, which will be convened by the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator.

Participants to the Incident Committee (IC) identify the issue(s), assess and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC/IDA Coordinator tracks all relevant information on the incident, the discussions during the Incident Committee (IC), and the decision(s) taken during the Incident Committee (IC) call.

At the start of the Incident Committee (IC) the IC SPOC and/or the incident reporter and/or the IDA Coordinator presents the issue. The parties discuss actions already taken by the affected party and immediate actions deemed necessary. The parties further consider correct classification of the incident for XBID related incidents.

The parties discuss potential solutions for the incident, where needed, on recommendation of the service provider. Once a solution has been identified, the parties decide on the application of the agreed solution.

During the Incident Committee (IC) the parties also decide on the deemed necessary communication to the market participants.

Within typically 2 hours after closing the Incident Committee (IC) call the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator will create/finalize the Incident Committee (IC) report and make it available to all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties need to review, and if applicable, update the Incident Committee (IC) report. In case of IDCT issues affecting IDAs, the IC SPOC will create the Incident Committee (IC) report and in case of IDA issues affecting IDCT, the IDA Coordinator will be in charge.

3. Incident Description

3.1 Course of Events

Due to a halt of the interconnectors by Terna in the XBID system, in combination with the incorrectly set "High Default ATC and Ramping" parameter, a rejection of IDA1 results was caused followed by an automatic cancellation of IDA1 by the XBID system.

3.2 Timeline

Event	Start	End

	Date & Time	Date & Time
Terna halts all their interconnectors in the XBID system.	31/10/2025 14:43	
Allocation request sent from IDA to XBID (normal process).	31/10/2025 15:20	
XBID CMM replies with an ErrorResponse (request rejection).	31/10/2025 15:20	
IDA Coordinator (OMIE) triggers Incident Committee.	31/10/2025 15:21	
JAO confirms that IDA1 was automatically cancelled in CMM at 15:20 due to a rejection of the Allocation Request.	31/10/2025 15:23	
IDA Coordinator (OMIE) raises a critical ticket to notify the Service Provider of the issue, request a detailed analysis, and verify the correct execution of the IDA 2.	31/10/2025 15:54	
Service provider starts to investigate the issue.	31/10/2025 16:07	
Service provider informs about the root cause. They also inform that the issue is not a bug and indicate that IDA2 is not expected to be affected.	31/10/2025 17:14	
Incident Committee is closed.	31/10/2025 17:34	

3.3 Incident Cause

After an in-depth analysis by DBAG, it can be confirmed that the incident was due to the fact that whilst eight interconnectors were placed on service halt, the parameter "High Default ATC and Ramping" was enabled, attempting to allocate non zero capacities to them.

ITAUST-ITNORD

ITSLOV-ITNORD

ITSUD-ITGREC

ITCSUD-ITMONT

ITNORD-ITSVIZ

ITSARD-ITCOAC

ITSICI-ITMALT

ITFRAN-ITNORD

Since the IDACZC file contained non-zero values and there were capacity allocations for these halted ICs, this resulted in the rejection of IDA allocations.

Impacted NEMOs

All NEMOs.

Impacted Bidding Zones

All Bidding Zones.

Impacted Borders

All Borders.

4. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learned

To ensure the successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

Short-term Solution by Affected Party	Terna will no longer place the following interconnectors in 'Service Halt': ITFRAN-ITNORD

	ITAUST-ITNORD ITSLOV-ITNORD ITSUD-ITGREC ITCSUD-ITMONT ITNORD-ITSVIZ ITSARD-ITCOAC ITSICI-ITMALT
Long-term Measures by Affected Party	Terna will request to set the parameter "High Default ATC and ramping" to 'No' for the following interconnectors: ITFRAN-ITNORD ITAUST-ITNORD ITSLOV-ITNORD ITSUD-ITGREC ITCSUD-ITMONT ITNORD-ITSVIZ ITSARD-ITCOAC ITSICI-ITMALT
SIDC Project Lessons Learned	Procedures must be followed when actions in the central systems are performed.