

SIDC OPSCOM Report

Critical Incident Experienced on 18 04 2026


20.05.2026

Content

1.	SIDC Continuous Trading	3
1.1.	Normal Operational Process	4
1.2.	Incident Management Process	5
2.	Incident Description	5
2.1	Course of Events	6
2.2	Timeline	6
2.3	Incident Cause	6
2.4	Impact	7
3.	Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learned	7

1. SIDC Continuous Trading

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) operates a single EU cross-zonal continuous intraday electricity market. In simple terms, buyers and sellers of energy (market participants) are able to work together across Europe to trade electricity continuously on the day the electricity is needed. The map below shows the European countries participating in the continuous intraday market.



For more information, please visit the [ENTSO-E](#) and [NEMO Committee](#) websites.¹

¹ This report serves to fulfil the obligation under Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management Regulation (CACM) on reporting unexpected market downtimes towards stakeholders.

1.1. Normal Operational Process

The process begins when SIDC/XBID contracts open for trading at Intraday Cross-Zonal Gate Opening Time (IDCZGOT). Market Participants (MPs) can view the available contracts in each Nominated Electricity Market Operator (NEMO) via their Local Trading System (LTS) and submit orders.


Orders from all connected market areas are then consolidated into a single shared order book. If bid and ask prices are crossed, orders are automatically matched and converted into trades. While MPs place orders in the shared order book, the origin of each order is retained. Transmission System Operators (TSOs) provide cross-zonal capacity to the market as it becomes available.

Trading in SIDC contracts continues until they close, or until the Intraday Cross-Zonal Gate Closure Time (IDCZGCT) deadline is reached. Following gate closure, NEMOs continue to offer trading without cross-border capacity allocation, in line with the trading schedules defined in the Shared Order Book.

Finally, physical delivery of power takes place. Continuous trading may still be possible after delivery, depending on the rules and capabilities of the local TSO.

The whole process is illustrated in the figure below.

SIDC continuous normal operation process



*IDCZGCT 30 project: in some borders, 30-minute IDCZGCT is already available, others will follow. For updates, please follow the NEMO Committee and ENTSO-E websites.

CZC – cross-zonal capacity
IDCZGCT – intraday cross-zonal gate **closure** time
IDCZGOT – intraday cross-zonal gate **opening** time
LTS – local trading system
MP – market participants
OBK – order book

The next section examines how the incident management process is applied when disruptions

occur.

1.2. Incident Management Process

An incident is defined as an unwanted event in the XBID system (SIDC's IT solution), in local NEMO or TSO systems connected to XBID, or a disruption of the communication channels linking these systems. An Incident Committee (IC) call is triggered when the issue cannot be resolved through a local backup procedure and may lead to breaching a critical SIDC deadline (e.g., gate closure or gate opening).

Operational parties follow the incident management procedure to handle such cases. This procedure assumes that communication with relevant third parties (e.g., CCP, shipping agent, explicit participants) is managed by the involved TSOs and NEMOs according to their local processes.

The incident management procedure outlines how incidents are addressed, including the operation of the Incident Committee and the application of fallback solutions such as closing and reopening interconnectors, restarting market or delivery areas, or suspending trading services.

The Incident Committee is convened only for critical or major incidents affecting the XBID system, a Transit Shipping Agent system, or in case of Shipping Agent default. Other incidents may trigger the IC only if they meet predefined criteria. To avoid unnecessary IC calls, parties perform an internal check and cross-check with other parties before escalating an incident as a central issue.

When an incident impacts any Single Intraday Coupling process, the IC is convened by the IC SPOC. Participants identify the issue, assess its impact, and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC records all relevant information, including discussions and decisions made during the call.

At the start of the IC call, the IC SPOC or incident reporter presents the issue. The parties review actions already taken and agree on immediate measures, ensuring correct classification of the incident. Potential solutions are discussed, including recommendations from the service provider where necessary. Once a solution is agreed upon, the parties decide on its implementation and any required communication to market participants.

Typically, within two hours after the IC call concludes, the IC SPOC prepares and finalizes the IC report and shares it with all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties review and update the report as needed.

2. Incident Description

On 18/04/2026 at approximately 12:52 CEST, an XBID core failover triggered a market outage.

Elevated latency affecting one of the XBID components resulted in a core failure, leading to an interruption of the service. The XBID service provider promptly investigated the issue and undertook the necessary remedial actions to restore operations. The root cause was identified as a network-related issue and was not associated with XBID functionality or system load conditions.

2.1 Course of Events

At 12:52, an XBID core failover was initiated.

At 12:58, parties joined the Incident Committee call.

At 13:00, all parties confirmed that services were on halt.

At 13:32, the core issue was still unknown.

At 13:33, The service provider began investigating and agreed to provide an update in the next 20 minutes.

At 13:38, The service provider confirmed the issue was resolved and agreed to provide more information on the core issue via a Jira production ticket.

At 13:42, all parties agreed to reopen the market at 13:50 CEST.

At 13:50, the market was set for trading.

At 13:52, all parties confirmed the system was up and running again.

At 13:55, all parties agreed to close the call.

2.2 Timeline

Event	Start	End
Incident occurrence	18/04/2026; 12:52	18/04/2026; 13:50
Triggering of Incident Committee	18/04/2026; 12:58	18/04/2026; 13:55

2.3 Incident Cause

According to the Root Cause Analysis provided by the XBID service provider, the incident was caused by a temporary network infrastructure issue at approximately 13:00 CEST, which resulted

in elevated latency within the underlying technical environment. Although connectivity was restored promptly, the latency affected XBID operations and triggered a core failover. The incident was infrastructure-related and was not associated with XBID functionality or system load conditions.

The issue was identified and resolved during the incident call, after which all services were restored and the market was reopened. The incident was not related to high system load.

2.4 Impact

Downtime	18/04/2026; 12:52
Critical Business Process Impacted	18/04/2026; 13:50
Procedural Impact	N/A

3. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learned

To ensure successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

Supplier’s Short-Term Measures	The XBID service provider solved the issue to restore the central system.
Supplier’s Long-Term Measures	The next scheduled maintenance will implement a correction to address this issue and help prevent reoccurrence in the future.
SIDC Project Lessons Learnt	N/A