SIDC OPSCOM Report

Critical Incident Experienced on 02 05 2026

04.05.2026

Content

1. SIDC Continuous Trading

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) operates a single EU cross-zonal continuous intraday electricity market. In simple terms, buyers and sellers of energy (market participants) are able to work together across Europe to trade electricity continuously on the day the electricity is needed. The map below shows the European countries participating in the continuous intraday market.

For more information, please visit the ENTSO-E and NEMO Committee websites.[1]

[1] This report serves to fulfil the obligation under Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management (CACM) on reporting of unexpected market downtimes towards stakeholders.

1.1. Normal Operational Process

The process begins when SIDC/XBID contracts open for trading at Intraday Cross-Zonal Gate Opening Time (IDCZGOT). Market Participants (MPs) can view the available contracts in each Nominated Electricity Market Operator (NEMO) via their Local Trading System (LTS) and submit orders.

Orders from all connected market areas are then consolidated into a single shared order book. If bid and ask prices are crossed, orders are automatically matched and converted into trades. While MPs place orders in the shared order book, the origin of each order is retained. Transmission System Operators (TSOs) provide cross-zonal capacity to the market as it becomes available.

Trading in SIDC contracts continues until they close, or until the Intraday Cross-Zonal Gate Closure Time (IDCZGCT) deadline is reached. Following gate closure, NEMOs continue to offer trading without cross-border capacity allocation, in line with the trading schedules defined in the Shared Order Book.

Finally, physical delivery of power takes place. Continuous trading may still be possible after delivery, depending on the rules and capabilities of the local TSO.

The whole process is illustrated in the figure below.

SIDC continuous normal operation process



*IDCZGCT 30 project: in some borders, 30-minute IDCZGCT is already available, others will follow.
For updates, please follow the NEMO Committee and ENTSO-E websites.

CZC – cross-zonal capacity
IDCZG**C**T – intraday cross-zonal gate **closure** time
IDCZG**O**T – intraday cross-zonal gate **opining** time
LTS – local trading system
MP – market participants
OBK – order book

The next section examines how the incident management process is applied when disruptions

occur.

1.2. Incident Management Process

An incident is defined as an unwanted event in the XBID system (SIDC's IT solution), in local NEMO or TSO systems connected to XBID, or a disruption of the communication channels linking these systems. An Incident Committee (IC) call is triggered when the issue cannot be resolved through a local backup procedure and may lead to breaching a critical SIDC deadline (e.g., gate closure or gate opening).

Operational parties follow the incident management procedure to handle such cases. This procedure assumes that communication with relevant third parties (e.g., CCP, Shipping Agent, explicit participants) is managed by the involved TSOs and NEMOs according to their local processes.

The incident management procedure outlines how incidents are addressed, including the operation of the Incident Committee and the application of fallback solutions such as closing and reopening interconnectors, restarting market or delivery areas, or suspending trading services.

The Incident Committee is convened only for critical or major incidents affecting the XBID system, a Transit Shipping Agent system, or in case of Shipping Agent default. Other incidents may trigger the IC only if they meet predefined criteria. To avoid unnecessary IC calls, parties perform an internal check and cross-check with other parties before escalating an incident as a central issue.

When an incident impacts any Single Intraday Coupling process, the IC is convened by the IC SPOC. Participants identify the issue, assess its impact, and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC records all relevant information, including discussions and decisions made during the call.

At the start of the IC call, the IC SPOC or incident reporter presents the issue. The parties review actions already taken and agree on immediate measures, ensuring a correct classification of the incident. Potential solutions are discussed, including recommendations from the service provider where necessary. Once a solution is agreed upon, the parties decide on its implementation and on any required communication to market participants.

Typically, within two hours after the IC call concludes, the IC SPOC prepares and finalizes the IC report and shares it with all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties review and update the report as needed.

2. Incident Description

This report informs stakeholders of a critical incident affecting the Single Intra-Day Coupling

(SIDC) market on 02/05/2026, resulting in a market interruption.

On 02/05/2026, the XBID production service experienced two interruptions affecting connectivity to the Shared Order Book (SOB), causing a market halt. The first interruption started at 10:55 CEST and connectivity was restored around 11:05 CEST. A critical JIRA ticket was raised at 11:07 CEST. A second interruption occurred at 11:23 CEST, again impacting all market participants. The issue was linked to elevated latency on a component of the XBID platform. The latency originated from activities in the data center environment. As a result, the platform temporarily lost coordination state, triggering protective core failovers. These failovers interrupted connectivity to the SOB. Around 11:50 CEST, the software provider operational teams communicated that stabilization actions had been performed and that the coordination state and SOB connectivity had been restored. Markets were officially unhalted at 12:05 CEST following the agreement among all parties in the IC call.

To prevent recurrence, the software provider plans to implement configuration changes to the platform's coordination layer, reducing dependency on latency-sensitive communication paths and enhancing operational stability.

2.1 Course of Events

2.2 Timeline

Event	Start	End
1st incident occurrence.	02/05/2026; 10:55	02/05/2026; 11:05
Triggering of Incident Committee.	02/05/2026; 11:07	02/05/2026; 12:07
2nd incident occurrence.	02/05/2026; 11:23	02/05/2026; 11:52
Market set back to trading		02/05/2026; 12:05

2.3 Incident Cause

The incident was caused by elevated latency affecting a component responsible for coordination within the XBID platform. The latency was induced by actions within the data centre environment, which led to temporary loss of coordination state, triggering protective core

failover and resulting in interruptions to the Shared Order Book connectivity and a subsequent market halt.

2.4 Impact

Downtime	52 minutes (02/05/2026; 10:55-11:05, 11:23-12:05).
Critical Business Process Impacted	XBID trading.
Procedural Impact	NA.

3. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learned

To ensure successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

Supplier's Short-Term Measures	Operational actions were taken to stabilize the platform. Core components completed failover, coordination state was re-established, and connectivity to the SOB was restored prior to the decision to unhalt the markets.
Supplier's Long-Term Measures	Planned change to how the service component experiencing latency is configured and operated within the XBID platform. The affected component is planned to operate in a non-replicated configuration so that latency introduced by replication-related data-centre activities does not impact service responsiveness.
SIDC Project Lessons Learnt	N/A.