

SIDC OPSCOM Report IDA cancelation

Intraday Auction 1 Delivery Date 05/08/2026


08.05.2026

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1. SIDC Intraday Auctions

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) operates a single EU-wide cross-zonal intraday electricity market, complemented by three Intraday Auctions (IDAs) that enhance efficiency and provide accurate price signals for scarce cross-border capacity. The map below shows the European countries participating in IDAs.



For more information, please visit the [ENTSO-E](#) and [NEMO Committee](#) websites.

1.1 Normal Process and Timings

Intraday Auctions occur several times per day, each with a predefined Order Book Gate Closure Time (OBK GCT). Twenty minutes before this closure, cross-zonal capacity allocation through Intraday Continuous Trading (IDCT) is suspended. This pause allows TSOs to update capacities based on the latest calculations and provide the necessary Cross-Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints for the auction.

At OBK GCT, NEMOs exchange these capacities and constraints across their systems and begin transferring Order Books to the central NEMO systems operating the Intraday Auction. Once all Order Books are received, the coupling process starts, taking into account the provided capacities and constraints.

After the auction results are generated, NEMOs validate them and make them available to TSOs via the SIDC Capacity Management Module for verification and allocation of Cross-Zonal Capacity on relevant bidding zone borders.


Once this window closes, cross-border continuous trading automatically reopens, and any possible incomplete Intraday Auction process is automatically cancelled. This report explores the circumstances and implications of such cancellations.

MCSC Daily Timeline

SDAC – SIDC – IDA daily timeline

D-1

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


SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15:00 / 22:00 / 10:00 CE(S)T

IDA timeline

Before IDA, the IDC CZC trading can be halted no more than **20 minutes**

During IDA, the IDC CZC trading can be halted no more than **20 minutes** under normal operation



IDA 1	14:40	14:45	15:00	15:20
IDA 2	21:40	21:45	22:00	22:20
IDA 3	09:40	09:45	10:00	10:20

1.2 Incident Management Process

An incident is defined as an unwanted event occurring within the SIDC IDA systems, the local NEMO or TSO systems connected to SIDC IDA, or the communication channels linking them. An incident that requires convening an Incident Committee (IC) call has the following characteristics: the issue(s) cannot be resolved through a (Local) Backup procedure and may result in breaching a SIDC deadline.

Operational parties have agreed to follow the incident management procedure for handling such incidents. This procedure assumes that communication with relevant third parties (e.g. CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participants) is managed by the involved TSOs and NEMOs according to their local processes.

As a general principle, the Incident Management procedure defines how incidents are addressed. This includes the operation of the Incident Committee (IC) and the application of measures such as closing and reopening interconnectors, restarting markets or delivery areas, suspending trading services, executing corresponding local procedures, and exchanging files in backup mode.

When an incident impacts any Single Intraday Market Coupling process, an Incident Committee (IC) must be convened by the IC SPOC or the IDA Coordinator. Participants in the IC identify the issue(s), assess the situation, and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator records all relevant information, including incident details, discussions, and decisions made during the IC call.

At the start of the IC call, the IC SPOC, the incident reporter, or the IDA Coordinator presents the issue. The parties review actions already taken by the affected party and agree on immediate measures. They also ensure the correct classification of the incident, particularly for XBID-related cases.

The IC discusses potential solutions, including recommendations from the service provider where necessary. Once a solution is agreed upon, the parties decide on its implementation. The IC also determines the appropriate communication to market participants.

Typically, within two hours after the IC call concludes, the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator prepares and finalizes the IC report and shares it with all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties review and update the report as needed. For IDCT issues affecting IDAs, the IC SPOC prepares the report; for IDA issues affecting IDCT, the IDA Coordinator is responsible.

2. Incident Description

This report informs stakeholders of an incident affecting the Intraday Auction 1 on 04/08/2026, resulting in auction cancelation in line with SIDC procedures. The incident occurred due to negative Preliminary Confirmation from Nord Pool IDA Nordic-Baltic.

2.1 Course of Events

2.2 Timeline

Event	Start	End
Incident occurrence	04/08/2026; 15:15	03/08/2026; 15:35
Triggering of Incident Committee	04/08/2026; 15:15	03/08/2026; 15:35
EMCO informed about problems that resulted in inability to send a preliminary confirmation.	04/08/2026; 15:15	
Message IDA_JOINT_08: Delay in IDA1 Results publication was sent to market participants.	04/08/2026; 15:19	
After the deadline for IDA cancelation because of missing preliminary confirmation was reached, IDA1 was canceled in the relevant XBID module based on the request of IDA coordinator and all borders were reopened for cross border trading.	04/08/2026; 15:34	
IDA cancelation message: IDA_JOINT_09: IDA Cancelation was sent to market participants	04/08/2026; 15:30	

Event	Start	End
All NEMOs aborted the session in PMB.	03/08/2026; 15:32	

2.3 Incident Cause

The Intraday Auction 1 on 04/08/2026 was cancelled in line with SIDC procedures due to negative Preliminary Confirmation from Nord Pool IDA Nordic-Baltic. The issue was caused by an order being stored in Nord Pool's system with a blank currency field. This occurred due to a brief unavailability of the master data service at the point when the auction system attempted to resolve the portfolio currency. The service became available again less than one second later, allowing the order to pass the subsequent currency-code validation despite the currency field remaining blank.

The issue has been resolved by introducing an additional validation safeguard: where the currency code cannot be resolved, the order will no longer be validated. This prevents orders containing incomplete or inconsistent currency data from being accepted into the order book.

2.4 Impacted NEMOs, Bidding Zones and Bidding Zone Borders

Impacted NEMOs:

ALL relevant for intraday auctions

Impacted Bidding Zones:

ALL relevant for intraday auctions

Impacted Bidding Zone Borders:

ALL relevant for intraday auctions

3. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learnt

To ensure successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

Short-term Solution by Affected Party N/A

Long-term Measures by Affected Party	The technical issue was identified and resolved shortly after its occurrence. However, due to its proximity to the IDA1 deadline, the corrective action could not have been implemented in time to avoid the impact on the auction. An additional validation safeguard has since been implemented to prevent orders with unresolved currency information from being accepted into the order book, thereby mitigating the risk of recurrence.
SIDC Project Lessons Learned	N/A