SIDC OPSCOM Report on the Critical Incident Experienced on 02/12/2025

07.01.2025

1. Executive Summary

This report provides information to stakeholders regarding the critical incident that occurred on 02/12/2025, affecting the Single Intra-Day Coupling (SIDC) market.

On 02/12/2025 there was an outage from 00:50 to 02:00 CET. The cause of the outage has been analysed by the service provider and it is related to a system that had run out of space, without any automatic alert being triggered. The XBID service provider has indicated that monitoring and alerts are already fixed so the issue is not repeated in the future. The incident is not related to high load or system performance issues.

2. Introduction

This report serves to fulfil the obligation under CACM Regulation on reporting unexpected market downtime towards stakeholders.

The report is structured as follows. In Chapter 3, SIDC is described. In Chapter 4, the normal operational process, as covered in the operational procedures with respective timings, is described. In Chapter 5, the incident management process applied when critical incidents occur is described. In Chapter 6, a description of the incident, including inter alia the timing and the root cause, is provided. Finally, in Chapter 7, the mitigation measures to resolve the issue and the lessons learnt are presented.

3. Single Intraday Coupling

The Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) creates a single EU cross-zonal intraday electricity market. In simple terms, buyers and sellers of energy (market participants) are able to work together across Europe to trade electricity continuously on the day the energy is needed.

An integrated intraday market makes intraday trading more efficient across Europe by:

- promoting competition
- increasing liquidity
- making it easier to share energy generation resources
- making it easier for market participants to allow for unexpected changes in consumption and outages

As renewable intermittent production such as solar energy increases, market participants are becoming more interested in trading in the intraday markets. This is because it has become more challenging for market participants to be in balance (i.e. supplying the correct amount of energy) after the closing of the day-ahead market.

Being able to balance their positions until one hour before delivery time is beneficial for market participants and for the power systems alike by, among other things, reducing the need for reserves and associated costs while allowing enough time for carrying out system operation processes to ensure system security.

See for more information the following websites:

- ENTSO-E
- NEMO Committee

4. Normal Operational Process

The normal operational process is described in the timeline below:



5. Incident Management Process

An incident is an unwanted event in the XBID system (SIDC's IT solution), local NEMO or TSO systems connected to XBID, or a disturbance of the communication channels connecting these systems. An incident that requires the triggering of an Incident Committee call has the following characteristics: the issue(s) causing the incident cannot be solved through a (local) backup procedure and can thereby breach a deadline (e.g. gate closure or gate opening) of the Single Intraday Coupling.

The operational parties agreed to follow the incident management procedure to handle incidents. The incident management procedure assumes that communication to relevant 3rd parties (e.g. CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participant, etc.) is undertaken by the involved TSOs and NEMOs following their local procedures.

As a general principle, the incident management procedure describes the handling of incidents, which includes the operation of the Incident Committee and the fallback solution to be applied following the procedures e.g. closing and re-opening of interconnectors, closing and restarting of market area(s), delivery area(s) or trading service.

The Incident Committee is only to be triggered for the management of a critical or major incident of the XBID system as well as critical or major incident of a Transit Shipping Agent System or Shipping Agent default. Any other incident can only trigger the Incident Committee when the incident fulfils the pre-defined criteria. In order to prevent the Incident Committee call being incorrectly triggered, the parties perform an initial internal check and a cross check with other parties on the incident, before raising the incident as a central issue.

As soon as an incident occurs that impacts any of the Single Intraday Coupling processes, an Incident Committee needs to be started, convened by the IC SPOC.

Participants to the Incident Committee identify the issue(s), assess and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC tracks all relevant information on the incident, the discussions during the Incident Committee and the decision reached during the Incident Committee call.

At the start of the Incident Committee the IC SPOC and/or the incident reporter presents the issue. The parties discuss actions already taken by the affected party and immediate actions deemed necessary. The parties further consider correct classification of the incident.

The parties discuss potential solutions for the incident - where needed - on recommendation of the service provider. Once a solution has been identified, the parties decide on the application of the agreed solution.

During the Incident Committee, the parties also decide on what communication to the market participants is deemed necessary.

Within typically 2 hours after closing the Incident Committee, the IC SPOC will create/finalize the IC report and make the IC report available to all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties need to review and if applicable, update, the IC report.

6. Incident Description

This report provides information to stakeholders regarding the critical incident that occurred on 02/12/2025, affecting the Single Intra-Day Coupling (SIDC) market.

On 02/12/2025 at 00:50 OMIE as IC SPOC noticed that several XBID modules were not working. Hence, OMIE opened a critical ticket with the XBID service provider to solve the issue and an Incident Committee was triggered.

During the Incident Committee other parties shared the same view as OMIE related to the availability of the different XBID modules.

The XBID service provider investigated the issue and performed the required actions to solve it. At 01:30 the modules were available again. However, parties could not access them.

Finally, at 01:47, the XBID service provider confirmed that all modules were up and running again. All parties present in the Incident Committee informed that they could access all modules. Hence, at 02:00 the IDCT market was reopened as agreed during the Incident Committee.

6.1 Timeline

NEMO Central Admin, following the detection of the critical incident, initiated the Incident Committee Conference Call ("ICCC").

02/12/2025

System failure	2025/12/02 00:50
System recovered	2025/12/02 01:47
Green light from supplier	2025/12/02 01:47
Green light from all parties to start trading	2025/12/02 01:50
Restart of trading	2025/12/02 02:00

6.2 Course of Events

At 00:50 OMIE, as IC SPOC, noticed that XBID modules were not working and opened a critical ticket with the XBID Service Provider.

At 1:06 the XBID Service Provider joined the Incident Committee call.

At 1:10 the XBID Service Provider explained that they were going to have an internal call to fix the issue.

At 1:13 parties confirmed that the XBID modules were not working.

At 1:17 XBID Service Provider explained that approx. at 1:25 it would inform the NEMOs of the estimated time that would take to fix the issue.

At 1:28 OMIE informed the XBID Service Provider that some NEMOs could not access some modules.

At 1:47 the XBID Service Provider explained that the applications were working.

At 1:50 the parties agreed to set the reopening time of the market at 2:00:00.

At 1:54 OMIE, as IC SPOC, sent the IDCT_NEMO_02 message with information on the time the market will reopen.

At 2:00 OMIE reopened the market and asked the NEMOs to confirm if all the applications were working.

At 2:05 all NEMOs confirmed that it was possible for them to access all modules, and that they could see the market open.

At 2:06 the Incident Committee was finished.

6.3 Root Cause

According to the Root Cause Analysis provided by the XBID Service Provider, the immediate cause was due to a system that had run out of space, without any automatic alert being triggered. As writing was no longer possible, XBID core halted. The fact that this was not noticed and did not trigger an automated alert was caused by a wrong monitoring setup. Monitoring and alerts have been fixed. Hence, the problem will not reoccur. The incident is not related to high load or system performance issues.

6.4 Impact

Downtime	02/12: 1 hour 10 minutes
Critical Business Process Impacted	XBID trading
Procedural Impact	N/A

7. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learned

To ensure a successful restoration of operations, the following measures were taken:

Supplier's Short-Term Solution	XBID service provider solved the issue to restore the central system.
Supplier's Long-Term Measures	XBID service provider has stated that monitoring and alerts have been fixed to avoid the incident to happen again in the future.
SIDC Project Lessons Learnt	N/A