SIDC OPSCOM Report on the Critical Incidents Experienced From 25/11/2025 to 29/11/2025

09.12.2025

1. Executive Summary

This report provides information to stakeholders regarding the critical incidents that occurred from 25/11/2025 to 29/11/2025, affecting the Single Intra-Day Coupling (SIDC) market.

During these days, the XBID service provider performed several maintenances and tests on their side which affected negatively the Intra-Day Continuous Trading (IDCT) market. These activities led to outages and to the interruption of the IDCT market on 25/11/2025, 26/11/2025 and 29/11/2025.

The cause of these outages has been analysed by the service provider. On Saturday 29/11/2025 DBAG scheduled Disaster Recovery Site Testing for their Equinix data centre. This is a planned, controlled exercise used to verify that a secondary data centre can successfully support critical IT services if the primary data centre becomes unavailable. All of the outages have been deemed related to a Disaster Recovery Site Testing on Saturday 29/11/2025 on the primary datacentre and its preparatory tasks. The incidents are not related to high load or system performance issues.

2. Introduction

This report serves to fulfil the obligation under CACM Regulation on reporting unexpected market downtime towards stakeholders.

The report is structured as follows. In Chapter 3, SIDC is described. In Chapter 4, the normal operational process, as covered in the operational procedures with respective timings, is described. In Chapter 5, the incident management process applied when critical incidents occur is described. In Chapter 6, a description of the incident, including inter alia the timing and the root cause, is provided. Finally, in Chapter 7, the mitigation measures to resolve the issue and the lessons learnt are presented.

3. Single Intraday Coupling

The Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) creates a single EU cross-zonal intraday electricity market. In simple terms, buyers and sellers of energy (market participants) are able to work together across Europe to trade electricity continuously on the day the energy is needed.

An integrated intraday market makes intraday trading more efficient across Europe by:

- promoting competition
- increasing liquidity
- making it easier to share energy generation resources

- making it easier for market participants to allow for unexpected changes in consumption and outages

As renewable intermittent production such as solar energy increases, market participants are becoming more interested in trading in the intraday markets. This is because it has become more challenging for market participants to be in balance (i.e. supplying the correct amount of energy) after the closing of the day-ahead market.

Being able to balance their positions until one hour before delivery time is beneficial for market participants and for the power systems alike by, among other things, reducing the need for reserves and associated costs while allowing enough time for carrying out system operation processes to ensure system security.

See for more information the following websites:

- ENTSO-E
- NEMO Committee

4. Normal Operational Process

The normal operational process is described in the timeline below:



5. Incident Management Process

An incident is an unwanted event in the XBID system (SIDC's IT solution), local NEMO or TSO systems connected to XBID, or a disturbance of the communication channels connecting these systems. An incident that requires the triggering of an Incident Committee call has the following characteristics: the issue(s) causing the incident cannot be solved through a (local) backup procedure and can thereby breach a deadline (e.g. gate closure or gate opening) of the Single Intraday Coupling.

The operational parties agreed to follow the incident management procedure to handle incidents.

The incident management procedure assumes that communication to relevant 3rd parties (e.g. CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participant, etc.) is undertaken by the involved TSOs and NEMOs following their local procedures.

As a general principle, the incident management procedure describes the handling of incidents, which includes the operation of the Incident Committee and the fallback solution to be applied following the procedures, e.g. closing and re-opening of interconnectors, closing and restarting of market area(s), delivery area(s) or trading service.

The Incident Committee is only to be triggered for the management of a critical or major incident of the XBID system, critical or major incident of a Transit Shipping Agent System or Shipping Agent default. Any other incident can only trigger the Incident Committee when the incident fulfils the pre-defined criteria. In order to prevent the Incident Committee call being incorrectly triggered, the parties perform an initial internal check and a cross check with other parties on the incident, before raising the incident as a central issue.

As soon as an incident occurs that impacts any of the Single Intraday Coupling processes, an Incident Committee needs to be started, convened by the IC SPOC.

Participants to the Incident Committee identify the issue(s), assess and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC tracks all relevant information on the incident, the discussions during the Incident Committee and the decision reached during the Incident Committee call.

At the start of the Incident Committee the IC SPOC and/or the incident reporter presents the issue. The parties discuss actions already taken by the affected party and immediate actions deemed necessary. The parties further consider correct classification of the incident.

The parties discuss potential solutions for the incident - where needed - on recommendation of the service provider. Once a solution has been identified, the parties decide on the application of the agreed solution.

During the Incident Committee, the parties also decide on what communication to the market participants is deemed necessary.

Within typically 2 hours after closing the Incident Committee, the IC SPOC will create/finalize the IC report and make the IC report available to all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties need to review and if applicable, update, the IC report.

6. Incident Description

This report informs stakeholders of the critical incidents affecting the Single Intra-Day Coupling (SIDC) market from 25/11/2025 to 29/11/2025, resulting in several downtimes on the XBID

central platform and interruption of the Intra-Day Continuous Trading (IDCT) market.

During these days, XBID service provider performed several maintenances and tests on their side which affected negatively the IDCT market. These activities led to outages and interruption of the IDCT market on 25/11/2025, 26/11/2025, 28/11/2025 and 29/11/2025.

The cause of these outages has been analysed by the service provider. All of them relate to a Disaster Recovery Site test intended for Saturday, 29/11/2025. While the test itself was scheduled outside business hours, preparatory tasks were carried out in the days beforehand, during which the related activities took place. They were planned for maintenance scheduled on Wednesday 26/11/2025, previously communicated to the Market Participants. However, on Tuesday 25/11/2025 the service provider started to perform some activities which caused disconnections from several NEMOs during the morning and afternoon.

On Wednesday 26/11/2025, the service provider started with network activities before the agreed schedule for their maintenance. These network activities were not supposed to affect the IDCT market. However, all LTS from the different NEMOs were suddenly disconnected from the central platform. Since the operational call for the maintenance between NEMOs, TSOs and service provider had started, the incident was solved, and the maintenance could start 30 minutes after the scheduled time.

On Friday 28/11/2025, the service provider communicated to NEMOs and TSOs that some human error had occurred during the maintenance on Wednesday 26/11/2025. So, a new maintenance was scheduled in the morning. These maintenance activities were also communicated towards the Market Participants. This maintenance was run without incidents.

On Saturday 29/11/2025, the service provider executed their Disaster Recovery Site testing activities. During the tests, they found out a major defect on their side which caused the IDCT market interruption from 13:26 to 14:55, which also led to the IDA1 DD 30/11/2025 cancellation.

On Saturday 29/11/2025 the service provider also informed about an extension on the scheduled maintenance of 01/12/2025. This extension was needed to bring back redundancy on the central system after the Disaster Recovery Site testing. Hence, on Monday 01/12/2025 the maintenance initially scheduled from 11:00 to 12:00 was extended and finished at 12:50 without incidents.

The incidents are not related to high load or system performance issues.

6.1 Timeline

NEMO Central Admin, following the detection of the critical incident, initiated the Incident Committee Conference Call (“ICCC”).

26/11/2025

System failure	2025/11/26 10:45
System recovered	2025/11/26 11:24
Green light from supplier	2025/11/26 11:24
Green light from all parties to start trading	2025/11/26 14:30
Restart of trading	2025/11/26 14:40

29/11/2025

System failure	2025/11/29 13:26
System recovered	2025/11/29 14:36
Green light from supplier	2025/11/29 14:36
Green light from all parties to start trading	2025/11/29 14:40
Restart of trading	2025/11/29 14:55

6.2 Course of Events

In all cases, several NEMOs suffered disconnections from the different XBID applications.

Some NEMOs called the IC SPOC, who was also aware of the issue since it was also affected.

Tickets in the incident management platform of the service provider were opened, in most of the cases by the IC SPOC. So, Incident Committee was open to discuss among all parties and inform the XBID service provider.

XBID service provider collected the data communicated in the ticket and the Incident Committee started to work on finding a solution.

After an hour or more, depending on the case, XBID service provider requested the parties to reconnect to the applications affected.

After all NEMOs informed that they had successfully connected their systems to the central platform, there was an agreement between NEMOs to reopen the IDCT market. It is usually scheduled 10 minutes after the green light from all NEMOs is communicated.

At the agreed time, NEMO Central Admin reopen the market at the central platform. NEMOs reopen the IDCT market internally immediately after.

6.3 Root Cause

According to the Root Cause Analysis provided by the XBID Service Provider, all the interruptions are related to the Disaster Recovery Site testing activities. The incidents are not related to high load or system performance issues.

The Root Cause for the incident on Wednesday, 26/11/2025, was an internal pre-maintenance network change and was not related to any external grid or infrastructure issue. However, it affected the connection of all LTS. The service provider has indicated that in the future all steps will be executed during a market halt to avoid this kind of incidents.

On Saturday 29/11/2025, XBID service provider decided not to shut down the primary physical hosts to ensure more flexibility in case of an incident during the Disaster Recovery Tests. However, this led to a disconnection of both data centres (primary and secondary) when the tests started. As soon as the service provider noticed the issue, they immediately shut down the primary physical hosts and, after some more actions on their side, the issue was solved.

6.4 Impact

Downtime	26/11: 39 minutes (incident) and 3 hours 16 minutes (maintenance) 29/11: 1 hour 29 minutes
Critical Business Process Impacted	XBID trading
Procedural Impact	N/A

7. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learned

To ensure a successful restoration of operations, the following measures were taken:

Supplier's Short-Term Solution	Finishing maintenance activities related to the Disaster Recovery Site tests.
Supplier's Long-Term Measures	The XBID service provider has stated that all operations related to maintenances will be performed during a market halt regardless of a seamless label. XBID service provider has adapted their future playbooks to cover the issues appeared during the Disaster Recover Test.

SIDC Project Lessons Learnt	More detailed Risk Assessment has been requested to the XBID service provider for future maintenance. No activities to be initiated by the XBID service provider before the maintenance schedule, even if they are not supposed to have an impact on the IDCT market.